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The Molding of a Communist
by
Dr. Fred C. Schwarz, Part 3
The rise of Stalin to complete power was unnoticed until
accomplished. It was widely anticipated
that the mantle of Lenin’s power would finally rest on the capable shoulders of
Nikolai Bukharin. Bukharin was a
brilliant Communist theorist, author of The ABC of Communism, head of
the Communist International after the decline of Zinoviev; a man of the caliber
of Lenin himself. When the vote was
taken, however, Stalin was victorious by a majority of four to three. Once the vote was taken it was binding on
all seven members of the Politburo.
Unanimously they went down to report the verdict to the Central
Committee and, finally, the vote at the top became the belief and the marching
orders of the entire Communist Party.
There is no way whereby quarreling among the leadership can transfer
itself to Party membership.
Stalin was then in complete power.
He appointed those whom he approved.
As secretary of the Politburo, he was in charge of the calling of the
meetings and determined the agenda of those meetings. From 1929 until his death in 1953 his power remained absolute.
The rise of Stalin to personal and absolute
dictatorship was not due to the qualities of his personality, but due to the
nature of the structure of the Communist Party. An accepted Communist principle is that every member is subject
to Party discipline. This is a
euphemism for the reality that every member is under constant, personal,
intimate supervision. The organized
instrument to administer Party discipline was called the Orgburo. Associated with it was the internal Party
police. Individuals rose to great
heights of administrative power within the Communist Party, yet the secret
police supervised their lives in minute detail. Their telephone calls were monitored. Their individual interviews were recorded. Their papers, both personal and public, were
at the disposal of the secret police who possessed a key to the safe of every
official. The only Communist official
to whom this did not apply was the number one man, Joseph Stalin. To him the secret police finally reported
and from him they took their orders.
Thus every member of the Politburo, powerful as he was, was isolated
from all other members. There was no
possibility of the prior consultation necessary if united and planned action
was to be taken at the Politburo meeting. If two members should meet and Stalin should become
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suspicious, they
could quickly be arrested and thus prevented from reaching the next
meeting. In this way, each meeting of
the Politburo was under the complete domination of Stalin. All other members in attendance were
isolated from each other and the information on which their decisions were to
be made was given to them by Stalin himself.
In this manner his power became limitless.
His achievements are unbelievable.
Khrushchev recounts them in detail in his speech attacking the cult of
personality and outlining the “mistakes” of Stalin, but he does not clearly
indicate how Stalin did it. He tells,
us, for example, that Stalin put to death the military leaders of Russia who
were the idols of the armed forces. He
tells us that Stalin caused to be arrested and shot for treason 70 percent of
the Central Committee that elected him to power in 1934–98 members out of
137. He tells us of entire
nationalities that Stalin destroyed. He
relates how, during the war, Stalin sat in an office with a globe in front of
him and gave specific orders to the military commanders in the field. In one operation alone, because of the
ignorance of Stalin and his refusal to heed the plea of the commanders in the
field, hundreds of thousands went to their deaths. Khrushchev tells us what Stalin did, but he does not explain what
gave him the power to do it. How does a
man put to death the majority of the military commanders? How does he put to death the majority of the
leaders of his own political party?
Khrushchev gives an indication when he says, “Different
members of the Politburo reacted in different ways at different times.” To understand this statement, we must
understand the situation that existed.
The Politburo was made up of seven men, each of them all-powerful within
his administrative department, but each of them under constant, hourly
surveillance. The internal Communist
secret police checked everyone they met, listened in on every phone
conversation, had a key to every safe, read every document, and reported
everything they did to Stalin. Two of
them might desire to confer on some question to come before the Politburo. They could not do it. If Stalin heard of their meeting, he would
have them arrested before the next session of the Politburo was called. Thus each of them came to a Politburo
meeting completely unaware of the attitude of the other members. Not one of them had any idea how the others
were going to vote. If a man voted
against Stalin and the motion was defeated, his life was ultimately
forfeit. This was the end result of the
all-or-nothing law of Communism. Only
when this situation is clearly visualized can we understand
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why the other
members of the Politburo were powerless to halt the cataract of Stalinist
criminality. Only in the light of the
understanding of Communist organization does the plaintive plea of Khrushchev,
“Different members of the Politburo reacted in different ways at different
times,” become significant.
Stalin occupied a position of limitless power from which he operated as
a tyrant unequalled in the annals of history.
But it was Communism, not Stalin, that was responsible for his
tremendous power. It was the
organizational structure of Communism that projected him to his all-powerful
position.
Communist organization remains the same. It has not changed. The
events following the death of Stalin recapitulate minutely the events following
the death of Lenin. Multitudes of
people stand up and say, “Ah, but there is a difference! Stalin used to execute those he expelled,
but Khrushchev does not.” Such people
have no knowledge of history. Lenin
died in 1924. Stalin came to total
power in 1929. The expellees from the
Politburo were not executed until 1936.
In the meantime, they were frequently given jobs appropriate to their
abilities in distant areas. The same
thing has happened since Stalin died.
Immediately after the death of Stalin, there was a period of collective
leadership followed by the
emergence of Bulganin and Khrushchev. Bulganin was eventually overthrown and
appointed to some minor position. At
the top was the all-powerful Khrushchev, projected by the Communist Party to
leadership of the Communist movement throughout the world.
Those who prate on the importance of public opinion within
Russia, and proclaim the power of the Red Army, are ignorant of the political
facts of life in Communist countries.
All power resides in the Communist Party. Some time ago a name frequently in public discussion was that of
Zhukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, friend of President
Eisenhower. Our pundits advised that
President Eisenhower and Zhukov meet and negotiate. They pointed out that the Red Army was a very powerful
organization and claimed that Zhukov as its Commander-in-Chief was the real
power in Russia. Let Zhukov and
President Eisenhower get together and they could iron out the problems of the
world.
In truth, Zhukov’s position as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army gave
him no more power than if he if had been the head of the Boy Scouts. All power is in the Communist Party. The Communist Party is a unified,
disciplined party. The man at the top
has all authority. From its membership
one disciplined man is taken and made Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. In his administrative position within the
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army he is very powerful, but as a Communist he is totally subject to the
orders that come down from the top of the Communist Party. Similarly, other men are selected to fill
all significant governmental, educational, cultural and religious positions,
but each of them owes complete obedience to the head of the Party.
The difference between the State and the Party is rarely
understood. The head of the Russian
State may be an insignificant individual.
When Stalin was all-powerful within Russia, while he was putting to
death the majority of the officers of the Red Army, the majority of leading
Communists, the majority of industrial managers, he was merely Secretary of the
Communist Party. When it was necessary
for him to meet with President Roosevelt in the capacity of chief of the Soviet
State, he appointed himself to that position.
When he thought it advisable, he appointed himself Commander-in-Chief of
the Red Army. But his power never
depended on his being President of Russia, or Commander-in-Chief of the Red
Army. His power was derived from his
position as head of the Communist Party.
For the Communist, the Party becomes the very voice and breath of
God. The statement by Nikolai Bukharin
before his execution is most revealing.
Said he, “Comrades, I feel it is my duty to make the following
statement. You all know that for three
months I would say nothing. Suddenly I
changed and confessed to everything of which I was accused by the Comrade
Prosecutor. Why the change? I think you are entitled to know. As the moment of death approaches and one
goes out into the great loneliness, the thought of going out alone, unforgiven,
apart from the Party in which I have lived and which to me has been life
itself, was a prospect I could not face; and, if by some miracle I should not
die, life outside the Party would to me be worse that death itself.” There is something frightening about a
movement that can evoke such devotion in one it is about to destroy.
The curse of Communism is that by the Party it creates, it takes the
idealism of its young recruits and uses it as an ultimate instrument of
dictatorship, tyranny and genocide.
Their intelligence is prostituted, their idealism debauched, and they
are molded into intellectual robots of unquestioning obedience and frightening
efficiency at the disposal of the dictator of the Party.
You Can Trust the Communist...to be Communists,
p. 46-50
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continued
from page 1
Larmer and John Leland in Newsweek.
On The McLaughlin Group, Eleanor Clift said: “To be a poor child
in Cuba may in many instances be better than being a poor child in Miami, and
I’m not going to condemn their lifestyle.”
As if living under the Communist yoke were a “lifestyle choice.”
These words could have come straight from the mouth of Juan Miguel
Gonzalez, Elian’s father. In an
interview with Dan Rather on 60 Minutes, for which he was obviously well
coached, Juan Miguel asked: “What’s freedom?”
Is it “for example, in Cuba, where education and health care is free. Or
is it the way it is here? Which of the
two is freedom? For example, here, when
parents send their children to school, they have to worry about violence. A child could be shot at school. In Cuba, things like that don’t happen.”
The quality of Cuba’s schools and the country’s literacy programs have
also been much discussed and compared favorably to what’s available in the
United States. On NPR’s Weekend
Edition, St. Petersburg Times editorial writer Diane Roberts spoke
of a trip she took to London, where her British friends sought answers about
the boorish American attitude toward the island nation: “They figure I
understand how a nation fixated on family values could hesitate for a moment in
restoring a grieving, traumatized child to his parent. I don’t understand. I have never been to Cuba, though most of my
British friends have. They come back
exclaiming over the turquoise water, the opulent rum, the friendly people who
manage to maintain their dignity despite dire poverty, poverty exacerbated by
the American embargo.”
Her British friends, Roberts assured her listeners, “also deplore Castros’
jailing of dissidents, gays, and writers.
They despise his refusal to hold elections. But most of my British friends have been to Florida, too...They
couldn’t help noticing that the literacy rate is higher in Cuba than in
Florida.” Cuba claims a 96 percent
literacy rate, but of course every single person there was born and raised
speaking Spanish. Florida has hundreds
of thousands of Spanish-speaking immigrants–many of them refugees from Cuba–who
are understandably not entirely literate in English.
Writing in Slate, Columbia journalism school professor Charles
Kaiser acknowledged that “the country is pitifully poor, the fancy new hotels
and restaurants built for the tourist trade are off-limits to Cuban citizens,
and food is far from plentiful. And
yet, despite all the hardship and real political oppression, the people remain
incredibly vibrant, the literacy rate is higher there than it is here, and
there is an astonishing array of music, theatre, and dance available to
everyone in Havana. The health care is
better, too.”
Would Kaiser, a gay activist, recommend to any HIV-positive friends
that they journey to Cuba, home of that
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superior health-care system, for their
treatment? Does he not know that Castro
has jailed homosexuals for “counterrevolutionary activities” since the
revolution and quarantined AIDS victims in the 1980s?
Michelle Singletary, a financial columnist for the Washington Post,
also visited Cuba and found the poverty kind of refreshing. “In Cuba there are no shelves full of Barbie
dolls. There is no Disney World,” she
wrote approvingly. “Instead are
aerodynamic skateboards or sparkling Rollerblades, many Cuban children are
forced to fashion their own toys. I
watched as three young boys darted around traffic on makeshift scooters made
out of old crates. Just down the
street, other boys were playing drums on empty cardboard boxes.”
Randall Pinkston of CBS, reporting from Havana, also noted that “people
appear untroubled by the lack of modern conveniences.” How different that is from what Singletary
finds here in the States: “So many of us in America live what Cubans would
consider very prosperous lives. Yet we
worry that we don’t have enough while our homes are filled with gadgets and things
paid for with money we don’t have. We
shower our children with so much stuff that there is always a perpetual layer
of toys in their pricey toy bins that they never play with again.”
Their very poverty, in the eyes of Singletary and Kaiser and Pinkston,
has given Cubans a spiritual and cultural vibrancy lacking in the softer
precincts of the United States.
There is something obscene about visitors to Cuba who revel in the
privation that Cubans have not chosen for themselves. It may be true that hardship is good for the soul, but none of
those singing its praises have taken their kids to Pennsylvania to bring them
up as Mennonites.
In the view of those who have journeyed to Cuba in the wake of Elian
Gonzalez’s rescue last year or have only paid vicarious imaginary visits to its
shores (like Diane Roberts), it seems that Fidel’s fiefdom may well be a civil
society superior to the raucous streets of Miami–which is, recall, a place in
which hundreds of thousands of people born in Cuba have demonstrated they can
prosper and exercise democratic political power if they are given the right to
do so.
It was precisely opinions like these–wide-eyed, credulous expressions
of moral equivalence between a totalitarian tyranny and the taken-for-granted
freedoms of the West–that helped solidify the anti-Communist alliance whenever
differences on other matters threatened to tear it asunder. The return of the useful idiots has brought
anti-communism back to life.
Our Cold War has begun anew.
The Weekly Standard, May 8, 2000, p. 14, 16
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Russia’s Cuban Connection
by
Stanislav Lunev, Part 2
The strategic importance of the Laurdez station has
grown substantially since a secret order was issued by former President Boris
Yeltsin on Feb. 7, 1996, that requires Russian intelligence to intensify the
theft of American and other Western trade and manufacturing secrets.
This military and domestic espionage presents a
formidable threat to the United States.
If there are still those who remain skeptical, to quote his own words,
“America’s friend in the Kremlim” Yeltsin ordered his secret agents “to close
the technology gap with the West and to make better use of industrial
espionage.”
The existence of the Laurdez SIGNIT station is,
nevertheless, well known to the West.
But it is only one of a number of secret Russian military presences in
Cuba. The others have still maintained
a successful cover. Only a very limited
number of intelligence specialists are aware that the Laurdez station is merely
a part of the Russian intelligence operations in Cuba, which are under the
general command of the main GRU [Russian Military Strategic Intelligence
Agency] center on the island.
This center, located near Havana, exists in addition
to the GRU field office, which operates out of the Russian Federation
embassy. The operatives in the center,
as well as those of the embassy, have as their chief assignment the recruitment
of people from the Latin American countries.
They train and send them to the United States, Canada and other areas of
the world to spy against America and its allies. The Russian-intelligence presence in Cuba comprises hundreds of
highly trained professionals.
In addition to GRU operations, the SVR (formerly the
KGB) has its own separate field office, intelligence center and other
intelligence stations. Hundreds of SVR
intelligence officers in Cuba are doing the same job as the GRU agents, and
their primary target is penetrating secrets of America as well as those of its
allies. Thus, the Russian Federation is
willing to pay any price to keep the Castro regime in power.
The new Russian elite considers Cuba an invaluable
trans-shipment nexus for drug trafficking from the so-called Golden Triangle
and Central Asia to the American continent.
Moscow’s Komsolmolskaya Pravda (July 1995) disclosed that Cuba is an
essential linchpin in the drug operations of the most powerful Russian
financial and industrial consortia, created in the 1990s by former KGB officers
with former KGB
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and Communist Party money.
This organization is headed by a four-star general,
who was the first-deputy KGB chief and boss of the fifth KGB Main Directorate. He is known for persecuting Soviet dissidents. His former KGB officers took control of, and
expanded, the drug route from Afghanistan to the United States and Western
Europe via the Trans-Caucasus and Russia.
These former KGB officers, the Moscow paper noted,
linked up with other former KGB men working in drug-producing areas of Laos,
Burma, Cambodia and Korea and with the KGB stationed at Camran Bay,
Vietnam. They then set up a shipment
chain between Cuba and these regions and the drug lords in Italy, Romania and
Colombia.
The Castro regime has not shed its totalitarian nature
and it never will. In addition to
Russian aid, it is being bolstered by support from other totalitarian and rogue
states. These countries all have one
major characteristic in common–they hate the United States and see Cuba as a
springboard for their anti-American purposes.
It isn’t easy to assess the scope of these influences, but, in the words
of the Russian newspaper Segodny, the Kremlin has proclaimed that “Russia needs
the Freedom Island again.”
With Moscow’s ongoing rapprochement with Cuba, the
prominent military analyst Pavel Felgengaur, well known for his high-level R.F.
military-defense contacts, stated in the same article, “If NATO seriously
contemplates deploying its nuclear weapons in Poland, our nuclear missiles may
reappear in Cuba.”
Russia continues to play its game of giving with one
hand and taking with the other. Despite
the reduction in the size of its nuclear arsenal, it is not only using Western
dollars to upgrade its nuclear-missile and other military technology, but also
is threatening to redeploy its weaponry on the soil of our nearest Atlantic
neighbor. Yet, many Americans would
like to “normalize” relations with this neighbor.
In reality, so-called normalization boils down to the
usual common denominator, “money.”
Normalization –i.e., accommodation of Castro despotism–means big bucks
for profit-hungry businessmen in the short term, but would seriously weaken the
United States in the long term. In the
latter case, no one wins, for no one will prosper in the second-rate,
subjugated America that will be the final result.
Let us hope we will not help fulfill Lenin’s prophecy
by selling communist dictators the “rope” with which to hang us.
Internet Vortex, April 2000, p. 25, 26.
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The Hammer-Gore Connection
by
John Elvin, Part 1
Why should anyone care, at this late date, about Vice President Al
Gore’s relationship with philanthropist-industrialist Armand Hammer, a wealthy,
globe-trotting dabbler in diplomacy who died eight years ago? Well, of course, there is the small matter
that Hammer was a top-shelf Soviet agent, but he might not have mentioned that
to Gore.
And there’s more. “Al Gore’s
relationship to the late Armand Hammer and Occidental Petroleum is important
for many reasons,” according to Charles Lewis, director of the Center for
Public Integrity and author of The Buying of the President 2000. Lewis tells Insight: “There is no
U.S. company that Gore is closer to, financially or socially, than Occidental,
one of the most controversial in America.
It was Occidental, via Hooker Chemical, that brought us Love Canal in
the 1970s. The configuration of the
vice president, Al ‘Earth in the Balance’ Gore, with an oil company is more
than a little surprising.”
Does
this mean that Gore’s highly touted environmentalism is tainted
with oil? Actually oil, coal and zinc,
but the biggest taint was Hammer himself.
It’s a matter about which the vice president is more than a little
sensitive.
The experience of Bob Zelnick, a veteran ABC News correspondent, might
be instructive to anyone delving into the links. Zelnick was warned off from reporting the Hammer-Gore connection
when he commenced writing his book, Gore, A Political Life. Zelnick was told in no uncertain terms by
Gore staffers that the vice president would “personally resent” intrusions by
the reporter into his family affairs and that Gore was “extremely sensitive”
about the Hammer connection. But the
reporter pursued his subject despite resistance by the Gore camp. Then, with the book nearing completion, he
was told by ABC that unless he dropped the project his newscasting contract
would not be renewed.
Such an ultimatum is extraordinarily rare; usually,
media employers are pleased when one of their own becomes an author–as a result
they benefit by association. Instead,
Zelnick not only was warned off but was fired when he refused to cave.
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The reason for ABC’s action, Zelnick was told in a memo from his boss,
David Westin, was that the network could be “held up to ridicule that our
reporting is influenced by views you/we have formed about the individual
covered.” This was a smoke screen that
could be dispersed quicker than you could say “Sam Donaldson,” Zelnick decided,
knowing that ABC’s Donaldson had
written and commented extensively about individuals he covered. Believing that the real reason was
ideological, Zelnick left ABC for academe.
After all that fuss, Zelnick presented a passable account of the
Gore-Hammer relationship but gave credit for the material mainly to Edward Jay
Epstein’s Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer. The connections revealed by Epstein include
Hammer’s cultivation of Albert Gore Sr., a fiddle-playing hill-country tobacco
farmer of grand ambition who rose to become an influential U.S. Senator from
Tennessee.
The elder Gore made many a mark upon the American landscape in the
course of his career; he was a kingpin in the establishment of the mighty
Tennessee Valley Authority, or TVA, effort to socialize electrical power and a
sponsor of the $50 billion National Highway Defense Act of 1956, the largest
public-works project ever undertaken.
He initially acquired substantial wealth as Hammer’s partner in the
cattle business.
Zelnick notes that, while receiving prize Angus stock from Hammer on
the one hand, Gore Sr. at the same time auctioned off portions of his
herd–reportedly at outrageously high prices–to lobbyist and others who wanted
his attention. Sometimes, according to
local accounts, purchasers didn’t even bother to pick up the livestock they had
bought. The author quotes former
Tennessee Gov. Ned McWherter, a staunch Gore ally: “I’ve sold some Angus in my
time, too, but I never got the kind of prices for my cattle that the Gores got
for theirs.”
According to scholars who have reviewed Gore Sr.’s archived letters at
the University of Tennessee, the senator did many favors for Hammer over the
years, intervening when U.S. policies conflicted with Hammer’s international
wheeler-dealing. “Through the 1950s and
well into the following decade, Hammer counted on Gore as his principal link to
the Democratic congressional leadership, and to defend his economic interests,”
writes Zelnick.
Another source familiar with Hammer, Neil Lyndon, a former personal
assistant who helped compile the last in a string of authorized and, critics
say, largely fictive biographies or autobiographies of Hammer, says the younger
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Gore and Hammer engaged in a “profound and prolonged involvement” as social and
political cronies. Lyndon credits Gore
Sr. with arranging the meeting that propelled puny Occidental Petroleum from a
tiny holding with two wells into a major player.
“As [a member] of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Gore
[Sr.] used his influence on the U.S. ambassador in Libya to arrange a meeting
between Hammer and King Idris,” then ruler of Libya. Lyndon says Hammer bribed the old king and a few ministers with
slightly more than $5 million and gained a concession that ultimately would
yield $7.5 billion per year in oil revenues.
“Al Gore Sr. was at Hammer’s side on the day he paraded King Idris up a
red carpet laid on the desert to open the new field.”
It was on advice from Sen. Gore that President Kennedy appointed Hammer
as an economic emissary of the Commerce Department and sent him to the United
Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Libya, India, Japan and the Soviet
Union. This was going on even as Hammer
devoted no small amount of energy to his clandestine role as a Soviet agent,
shuffling money back and forth between Russia and the United States.
Was the U.S. intelligence community asleep at the wheel? Actually, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover had
been observing Hammer’s operations since the 1920s and was well-aware of his
role as a Soviet agent, but Hoover also was aware of the political
realities. During the Franklin
Roosevelt administration, when Hoover was gathering power and building the FBI
into a first-class investigative agency, Hammer was all but invulnerable due to
close ties as a White House regular and benefactor of Eleanor Roosevelt. Later, Gore Sr. chaired the Senate committee
overseeing FBI activities. Through Gore
and other top Washington connections, Hammer continued to checkmate Hoover.
“Hammer was involved in any number of dubious dealings all over the
world,” Lewis tells Insight. “He
was personally close to both Al Jr. and his father, who was paid $500,000 by
Occidental upon losing his Senate seat.”
In fact, as president of Occidental’s Island Creek coal division and a
member of Occidental’s board of directors, Gore Sr.’s salary was reported as
$750,000 per year back in the days when three-quarters of a million dollars was
real money. Island Creek was at the
time the third-largest coal producer in the United States.
Once free of Hammer’s payroll, Lyndon tore a fairly large chunk out of
the hand that had fed him, terming his former boss “one of the [last] century’s
most sinister figures,” as well as “the godfather of American corruption” who
“bribed and suborned elected representatives at all levels of American life,
from city assemblymen and mayors to presidents.” Lyndon said in an article in London’s Sunday
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Review that
Hammer liked to claim he had Gore Sr. “in my back pocket,” patting his wallet
with a chuckle.
During the time he worked for Hammer, authorized biographer Lyndon
says, Gore Jr. often dined with his father’s patron in the company of
Occidental’s “lobbyists and fixers who, on Hammer’s behest, hosed tens of
millions of dollars in bribes and favors into the political world.” As for Gore’s orchestration of VIP treatment
for Hammer during the Bush inauguration, Lyndon asks: “Why did Gore Jr. allow
himself to be so closely embroiled in a compromising connection with such an
unalloyed crook? He had little
choice. He inherited from his father
the mantle of being Hammer’s principal boy in Washington. Gore’s father effectively delivered his son
into Armand Hammer’s back pocket.”
That would be an example of the more forthright ways that Hammer did
business with politicians. He also
apparently was quite comfortable with covert dealings. In 1972, one of his operatives provided
$54,000 in laundered $100 bills to Nixon fund-raiser Maurice Stans, a maneuver
that resulted in Hammer’s conviction on three counts of making illegal campaign
contributions. President Bush pardoned
him in 1989 for that lapse in covering his tracks.
Earlier, Gore Jr. engineered Hammer into a section reserved for
senators at Ronald Reagan’s 1981 inauguration.
Reagan had been warned that Hammer was a Soviet agent and ignored
Hammer’s attempts to greet him. And
Reagan became one of the few presidents who evaded Hammer’s inroads, though he
couldn’t totally ignore the philanthropist’s contributions to causes such as
Nancy Reagan’s White House redecoration fund.
He did not grant Hammer’s persistent pleas for a pardon for the
Watergate Era misdemeanor convictions, and he didn’t appoint Hammer to any
prestigious boards or committees. But
Reagan did provide some cagey recognition in a note allowing that he valued
Hammer’s “insights on our policy toward the Soviet Union.”
It would seem that Reagan was well-aware that he was thanking the fox
for advice on protecting the henhouse.
Sources tell Insight that, in the 1980s, then-president Reagan
asked international journalist Arnaud de Borchgrave about Hammer at a dinner in
Los Angeles. “Reagan had just read
Arnaud’s book, The Spike, containing descriptions of the different types
of Soviet agents,” according to one of the sources familiar with the
story. “Arnaud described Hammer as a
Soviet agent of influence. Reagan said,
‘I’ve known that, but I wanted to get it from somebody who really knows.”
Watch for the conclusion of this article in the August Schwarz Report.
Insight, May 22, 2000, pp. 10-13, 31
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