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of Angola (UNITA), MPLA well may have given
the coup de grâce to its political and military opposition by killing Savimbi
on Feb. 21, six days before dos Santos’ face-to-face meeting in Washington
with President George W. Bush — a meeting supposedly intended to encourage
reconciliation between the warring factions. Intelligence sources tell Insight
that dos Santos personally gave the command to kill Savimbi. Whether that
can be corroborated, it is clear that while dos Santos had it almost within his
power to kill Savimbi since October 2001, the prospect of the Bush visit
encouraged him to give orders for the kill as soon as possible, the sources
said.
Despite oil revenues
amounting to some $3.5 billion a year, the Angolan government is chronically
broke. The Economist magazine reported in January 2000 that "the
bulk of the money bypasses the budget, disappearing straight into the hands of
the presidency." Indeed, the magazine said that the oil revenues for the
next three years "had already been spent." According to Alexander’s
Gas & Oil Connections, an industry data source, in July 1999 the oil
companies, including Chevron, paid Angola $900 million in "secretive
signature bonuses" for exploration leases. Such up-front payments are not
based on production, but are an on-the-books way to get around the antibribery
provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. officials suggest. As for the need
for a signing bonus, an intelligence source tells Insight: "They
used the money to buy tanks, armament, MiGs, chemical weapons and foreign
advisers to hunt down and kill Savimbi."
For many years the military
arm of the MPLA, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), had been frustrated in its
attempts to take out UNITA’s leader because Savimbi’s troops had broad
support among the local population and had been well-trained in rapid guerrilla
movements by the man they called the "Black Cockerel." "The fish
swim in the ocean of the people," says the guerrilla maxim. Moreover, the
coalition of tribal peoples that formed the basis of his support deeply
distrusted the mestiços, the detribalized and assimilated minority that ruled
in Luanda.
"MPLA decided to drain
the ocean," a congressional-staff African expert tells Insight.
"When they learned that Savimbi was in the northern province of Moxico,
they instituted a scorched-earth policy. They used chemical weapons to defoliate
the trees and kill the crops. Then they burned the villages. The people had no
food and no houses, so they fled. MPLA forces then rounded up columns of as many
as 700 refugees when they could and confined them to camps near the provincial
capital. The FAA especially targeted groups trying to get across the border into
the Congo [Zaire], because they assumed that the women and children included
dependents of UNITA soldiers."
Once the area was
depopulated, the FAA could assume
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that any movements picked up by satellite
imagery would be those of UNITA forces, the source says. After that, it was just
a matter of time.
Lisbon’s Diario de
Noticias gave an account of Savimbi’s death through the eyes of the enemy
FAA commander, Brig. Simao Carlitos Waly, according to a Foreign Broadcast
Information Service text. The Lisbon report says Savimbi was cornered with the
assistance of foreign commandos. Nevertheless, even the brigadier’s account,
given in a press conference at Luanda on Feb. 23, could not avoid a kind of
professional admiration of the gallantry of his enemy’s last stand. "By
traveling to the Luvuei region, Savimbi would have to pass through dense
bush," said Waly. "We continued to pursue him. As soon as he reached
the Luvuei River he was caught in an ambush set up by our forces. Upon arriving
in the area, Savimbi thought he had lost us. He tried to let his troops rest and
reorganize. … Through reconnaissance missions we learnt that he passed through
the area. We began to fire all our artillery. We used all the information we had
at our disposal. During the first phase we shot Savimbi seven times. He [still]
tried to pick up a weapon and defend himself when he saw all his guards were
dead."
On the same day that Waly
gave his account, Robert Boucher, the U.S. State Department spokesman, released
a statement in Washington. "Jonas Savimbi has been killed," Boucher
said. "The death of the UNITA leader is yet another casualty in a war that
should have ended long ago. We call upon both sides, in conjunction with the
peaceful opposition, civil sectors and international community, to fulfill their
obligation to bring peace to the Angolan people." At the White House press
briefing, a journalist asked Ari Fleischer, the White House press spokesman,
what impact the Savimbi killing would have on the talks with dos Santos.
"Does the White House think that the dos Santos government set Savimbi up
for assassination, in effect, to get him out of the way before dos Santos gets
here?" a savvy reporter asked. Fleischer, a master of the nonanswer, was at
his smoothest: "Well, the United States is still committed to achieving
peace development through equitable solutions in Angola. And the president calls
upon all Angolans to fulfill their obligations to peace there."
The next day, Feb. 27,
President Bush met with dos Santos and the presidents of Mozambique and Botswana
and issued a brief statement: "Today I met with three presidents who can
help bring peace and prosperity to southern Africa. The three presidents also
discussed the tragic wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We
agreed that peace is within reach of both countries. I urged President dos
Santos to move quickly toward achieving a cease-fire in Angola. And we agree
that all parties have an obligation to seize this moment to end the war and
develop
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Angola’s vast wealth to the benefit of the Angolan
people."
UNITA’s political
leaders immediately turned to Savimbi’s second-in-command, Vice
President Antonio Dembo, as their man to negotiate reconciliation with the
MPLA. Four days after dos Santos met with Bush, FAA forces in Angola
encountered Dembo, who had escaped the original massacre, and shot him
down like a dog.
Angola watchers were
not surprised at the administration’s mild response to these dramatic
events. Last October, former U.S. ambassador Paul Hare, now executive
director of the U.S.-Angolan Chamber of Commerce, which represents U.S.
corporations operating in Angola, put it bluntly: "It appears the new
American administration wants to pursue a policy of active engagement with
the Angolan government. The emphasis will be on practical results and not
rhetorical statements. The reasons for this approach are severalfold.
Angola’s present and potential energy resources are becoming more
important every day. The oil is plentiful and accessible, and is also the
type of crude which the United States needs."
Now such matters are
in the domain of National Security Adviser Rice, late of the Chevron
board. Lewis, of the Center for Public Integrity, says: "These
multibillion-dollar oil interests are active all over the world. So how in
the world do you recuse yourself from the interests of a company like
Chevron? This may be more of an issue about the recusal process and how it
works. I don’t see any way at all honestly that she can serve as
national-security adviser and fully, 100 percent, take herself out of
matters that may pertain to Chevron. I think it would virtually be
impossible for her to function, in all honesty."
Certainly Rice is
very gifted. She attended the University of Denver, entering at age 15 and
taking Soviet studies with Joseph Korbel, the father of former secretary
of state Madeleine Albright. Rice earned a master’s degree at the
University of Notre Dame and a doctorate from Denver’s Graduate School
of International Studies. She went to Stanford University in 1981 to study
arms control and, in 1986, joined the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as a Council on Foreign Relations fellow.
Rice was named to the
Chevron board in 1991 after leaving her post on the staff of President
George H.W. Bush’s National Security Council, where she served as
director of Soviet affairs. Now she eagerly was sought after by the
establishmentarian intelligentsia. In addition to her call to serve the
board of Chevron, she was chosen to serve on the boards of Charles Schwab
Corp., Transamerica Corp., Hewlett Packard, the international advisory
council of J.P. Morgan, the Carnegie Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace and the Rand Corporation. She also was on the
board of Notre Dame and provost and vice president of Stanford, as well as
on the boards of a number of other educational institutions.
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This résumé was a good fit
with the moderate conservatism of George W. Bush, whom she had served as
foreign-policy adviser during the presidential campaign. When nominated, she
filed papers indicating that she had more than $250,000 in Chevron stock and
an income in excess of $550,000 per year. Insight attempted many times to
reach Rice’s office to ask for comment on her service with Chevron, but
received no reply.
During the decade that
Rice served on the Chevron board, the corporation prospered, according to
its annual reports, going from total revenues of $38.9 billion in 1991 to
$50.6 billion in 2000, with net income rising from $1.2 billion in 1991 to
$5.2 billion in 2000. On Oct. 10, 1991, Chevron acquired Texaco Corp.,
resulting in combined revenues in excess of $100 billion.
Chevron’s role in
Angola dates back to the days of Portuguese colonial rule, when Gulf Oil
Corp. opened fields in the Atlantic Ocean just offshore from the province of
Cabinda. (Gulf was acquired by Chevron in 1984.) Cabindans claim that
Cabinda never has been part of Angola. Geographically, it is an exclave
separated from Angola by a narrow slice of the Congo (Zaire) and the mighty
Congo River delta.
In the late sixties
three revolutionary groups contended to control Angola: MPLA in Luanda and
the west, UNITA in the east and the south and Holden Roberto’s Front for
the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), a smaller group headquartered in
the northern provinces. The MPLA called on Portugal for assistance, then
ruled by a friendly Marxist military junta, and brought in some 30,000 Cuban
troops and Soviet advisers and arms. The first thing MPLA did was to march
into the Cabinda exclave and seize the prize: the offshore oil fields that,
according to recent statements by Chevron, constitute 50 percent of the
Angolan government’s gross domestic product.
The people of Cabinda,
more closely related to ethnic groups in the Congo than Angola, have
received a mere pittance of the oil revenues taken from their territory.
They live in great poverty. A fourth, much-splintered, revolutionary group
known as the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Exclave (FLEC) has
sought independence for Cabinda, conducting a low-level insurgency of
harassment and sabotage of oil facilities, seizing villages for a brief time
as a demonstration and kidnapping oil-company employees.
Maybe the issue has
been those oil royalties; maybe it has been freedom. In 1980, with the
election of Ronald Reagan, the new administration backed the MPLA’s
pro-Western rival, Savimbi. A charismatic leader who spoke nine languages,
Savimbi represented the vast majority of Angolans who lived in tribal
societies in the countryside. The new U.S. president saw Savimbi as an
anticommunist fighting for freedom.
"Reagan was an
admirer of Jonas Savimbi," Jeanne
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Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador
to the United Nations at the time, said recently. "Ron Reagan
cared a very great deal about freedom. He detested tyranny. He
detested imperialism and colonialism, and he detested communism
because it stood for these things. And wherever there were people
who had been or were about to be sucked into the Soviet empire and
conquered by Soviet forces, who were struggling to preserve or to
establish their freedom, Reagan said, ‘I want us to stand with
those people who are struggling for freedom and independence.’"
Savimbi was
able to support his movement by taking over the diamond mines in the
north, exporting the diamonds through friendly Zaire and by getting
supplies via Namibia to the south. The first Bush administration,
listening carefully to Chevron and the oil industry, did little to
disturb the status quo but kept pushing for "free and fair
elections" between the communist and anticommunist factions.
Savimbi reluctantly agreed, and the elections were held on Sept.
29-30, 1992, in the waning months of the Bush administration. The
international diplomatic elite rushed to pronounce the elections a
success, among them U.S. Ambassador Herman Cohen, who was then
assistant secretary of state for African affairs. "They were
free and fair," Cohen tells Insight today.
But some
election observers had a different conclusion. Margaret Hemenway, a
longtime Hill staffer who was part of the U.N.-authorized official
delegation, tells Insight: "The first one to report
fraud was Holden Roberto. We saw polling places in the morning with
no voters. We went in and said ‘What’s going on?’ The ballot
boxes were already full. We went back to Luanda and UNITA candidates
saw their computer vote tallies actually descending as they watched
the screen. They couldn’t believe it."
A report issued
in November 1992 by the Washington-based Center for Security Policy,
headed by former top Pentagon official Frank Gaffney, gave more
details: Registration of voters was closed 40 days before the
election; large numbers of polling stations reported identical
numerical results; only the MPLA was allowed access to
government-controlled television; pre-election bribery of voters by
MPLA was rife; in some areas as many as 25 percent of the ballots
cast were nullified; and electricity blackouts took place in a
number of key provinces as the votes were being tabulated. Finally,
according to the report, U.N. special envoy Margaret Anstee stated
that she "had never witnessed a more unfair election, even in
Latin America."
Cohen says
Savimbi refused to accept the outcome from the start. "He told
me he was going back to war because he had to save the Ovambindu
people from being ruled by the Marxists," Cohen says today.
"He made that decision early
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on. He even told me that he had enough troops
around the country that he could easily win the war, and he almost did. He went
pretty far."
But Hemenway says Savimbi
told her that, "Even though there was massive fraud and I was cheated, I
will accept." In fact, the terms of the election called for a runoff if
neither presidential candidate achieved more than 50 percent of the vote.
Savimbi sent his vice president, Jeremias Chitunda, a Western-educated diplomat
well-known in Washington and other capitals, to go to Luanda to arrange the
terms for the runoff election. But on Oct. 31, 1992, the capital descended into
chaos.
Amnesty International’s
1996 report stated: "Intense fighting broke out in Luanda. Government
forces attacked UNITA offices and residences. The [Rapid Intervention Police]
and ordinary police, assisted by civilians to whom they had distributed arms in
the preceding weeks, carried out house-to-house hunts for UNITA supporters. Many
hundreds died in the crossfire or were deliberately killed. Hundreds of others
were taken into police or military custody. Prisoners were taken in truckloads
to the Camama cemetery on the outskirts of the city where they were shot and
buried in shallow graves. Another mass grave is reported to be at Morro da Luz,
a steep ravine in the Samba area of Luanda where suspected UNITA members were
taken to be pushed off."
The most prominent victim
of this ethnic cleansing was Chitunda. His official convoy, traveling with a
white flag of peace, was ambushed and forced off the road. The Associated Press
reported on Nov. 2, 1992, that Chitunda was pulled from the car and shot in the
face. Another member of the party also was shot in the head; a third, although
wounded, got away to tell the tale. Both the U.S. State Department and Human
Rights Watch have reported that the dos Santos government consistently has
refused to return Chitunda’s body to his family for burial. Hemenway says that
this betrayal was the root cause of Savimbi’s subsequent distrust in dealing
with Luanda.
Cohen’s version is more
benign: "I don’t know whether Chitunda’s death had any impact on
Savimbi. I didn’t speak to him after that. From what I heard, they were killed
in an automobile accident when their car went off the road. I didn’t hear that
they were deliberately murdered, but I don’t have firsthand evidence. But
anyway, it didn’t seem to change Savimbi’s point of view — he wanted to go
on with the war."
In 1993, Cohen resigned
from the State Department and registered with the Justice Department as a
foreign agent for the Luanda regime. Although the Angolan contract has expired,
his firm most recently registered as an agent for the Robert Mugabe regime in
Zimbabwe, which has just
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completed a ruthless election
based on the Angolan Leninist model.
In 1993 the Clinton administration proclaimed sanctions against
UNITA "to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the
foreign policy of the United States by the actions and policies of
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)."
The nature of this unusual and extraordinary threat was not
specified. Some say that a key player behind the sanctions was the
international entrepreneur and investment banker Maurice Templesman,
whose diamond interests in Angola had been compromised by Savimbi.
Templesman was
very close to the Kennedy family, and indeed frequently was seen as
the companion of Jackie Kennedy Onassis. Onassis and Templesman even
entertained Hillary and Bill Clinton aboard Templesman’s 70-foot
yacht Relemar. But his closest influence may have been on the
late Michael LeMoyne Kennedy, who was operating Citizens Energy
Corp. in Massachusetts, a nonprofit set up by Michael’s brother,
Joseph Kennedy II, to get cut-rate fuel oil to the needy. And never
mind that Citizens Energy had a for-profit affiliate, Citizens
Energy International, where the Kennedy brothers were wheeling and
dealing in the oil business.
The Boston
Globe reported in 1998 that Michael Kennedy earned more than
$622,000 in salary and stock options in two years on the for-profit
side. A cornerstone of this for-profit business was an oil
concession in the Cabinda field that Templesman persuaded dos Santos
to award to
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Kennedy, the Globe says. In turn,
Kennedy was the founder of the U.S.-Angolan Chamber of Commerce, that glittering
roster of U.S. firms operating in Angola, and the main advocate of stabilizing
the dos Santos regime by forcing the surrender of Savimbi.
Although UNITA (unlike FLEC)
never attacked the oil installations and, in fact, had pledged not to do so, the
goodwill of the Marxist regime was about to assume greater importance. Until the
mid-nineties, Chevron was operating from the continental shelf off Cabinda; but
now it was about to move 40 miles offshore to the deep ocean. "Reserves
have been in proportions far exceeding anything on shore," commented Alexander’s
Gas & Oil Connections. All during this decade of tightening
relationships between Chevron and the Angolan regime, Condoleezza Rice sat in
the catbird seat as developments were placed before the board. Last September,
President Bush renewed the sanctions against UNITA, using language identical to
Clinton’s about "the unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign
policy of the United States" posed by Savimbi.
The renewal of sanctions
sent a message to dos Santos that he would not be penalized for eliminating the
leadership structure of UNITA. In October 2001, the scorched-earth policy began,
dislocating thousands of civilians and destroying their livelihoods. In February
the need to accommodate Savimbi was ended with seven bullets. Dos Santos shook
hands with the president, had a photo-op and a three-minute speech and went home
to enjoy his victory.’’
—Insight magazine,
April 29, 2002
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CNN, At It Again
When CNN opened a Havanna office five
years ago, bureau chief Lucia Newman said Cuban officials had promised the
network ‘total freedom to do what we want to work without any prior
censorship.’ Perhaps that’s because they knew CNN would censor itself.
According to a new study by the Media Research Center, CNN’s
Havana-based journalists have produced 212 prime-time reports on the Cuban
government or life on the island. A grand total of seven of them dealt
with political dissidents or prisoners, which is fewer than the number of
stories CNN ran in the first three |
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months
of this year about alleged human-rights abuses of Taliban prisoners held
at Guantanamo Bay. The bureau also put out a mere four stories on the
absence of democracy in Cuba, including one that had Newman remarking that
Cuba’s one-candidate ‘elections’ contained none of the ‘dubious
campaign spending’ found in the U.S. Overall, Communist spokesmen were
given six times more airplay than non-Communist ones. Perhaps this is
because the non-Communist ones would fear for their lives if they spoke
against the regime—a great story in itself, if only CNN would report
it."
—National Review, June 3, 2002, p.
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Rewriting Communist Vietnam
History
by Jamie Glazov
The suffering of the Indochinese
people under communism is one of the most tragic sagas of the 20th
century. The terror that communists perpetrated in Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos after their victory in 1975 defies simple characterization. The
leftists among us, meanwhile, continue to spout their lies about Southeast
Asia and about the horror that communism brought to that region.
Just like
contemporary neo-nazis who revel in practicing holocaust denial, leftists
just simply can’t help themselves from engaging in gulag denial. They
love erasing the historical memory of the millions of people who were
liquidated on the altar of socialist ideals. And engaging in historical
amnesia is precisely where socialists and neo-nazis share one of their
most sacred common bonds.
And now we have H.
Bruce Franklin, a professor of English and American Studies at Rutgers
University, who has stepped forward to tell us that communism only brought
peace and fraternity to Indochina.
In the March-April
2002 edition of the International Socialist Review, which is
otherwise known as the Journal of Revolutionary Marxism (and this
title is not meant to be a joke), Franklin writes an article glorifying
the memory of the anti-war movement in America during the Vietnam War.
Titled "Vietnam. The Antiwar Movement We Are Supposed To
Forget," the essay is an excerpt from Franklin’s book Vietnam
and Other American Fantasies (University of Massachusetts Press, 2000)
Franklin pleads with
his readers not to forget the anti-war movement, which he complains the
capitalists in America have forced people to do. He emphasizes that
remembering the anti-war movement is crucial, since it triumphed in
bringing about an American defeat and a communist victory in Southeast
Asia. And he means this in a positive sense.
Usually I read the International
Socialist Review for the same reason I read other Marxist and
socialist literature: for a good laugh. It really is very amusing.
Sometimes I get the
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giggles for hours on end after reading
our contemporary leftwing intellectuals’ ongoing agony about capitalist
modes of production, surplus value, expropriation, and the
near-approaching Marxist revolution. Reading this stuff is sometimes so
hilarious that I succumb to sidesplitting fits of laughter.
But oftentimes it’s
not very funny at all.
Aside from how
pathetically stupid it is, there is little that is funny about Marxism.
There is little that
is funny about a set of ideas that has resulted in the liquidation of a
100 million lives in the 20th century.
So this time around,
I wasn’t very humored when I stumbled onto Franklin’s piece on
Vietnam.
Franklin praises the
anti-war movement, which allowed the communist victory and paved the road
for the subsequent mass genocide in Indochina. He writes that the anti-war
movement should be "one legitimate source of great national pride
about American culture and behavior during the war. In most wars, a nation
dehumanizes and demonizes the people on the other side. Almost the
opposite happened during the Vietnam War. Countless Americans came to see
the people of Vietnam fighting against U.S. forces as anything but an
enemy to be feared and hated. Tens of millions sympathized with their
suffering, many came to identify with their 2,000-year struggle for
independence, and some even found them an inspiration for their own
lives."
It is precisely an
interpretation like this that reflects one of the most putrid lies of the
Left: that "the people" can somehow be associated with the
communists who imprison them. In other words, Franklin writes on the
assumption that the U.S. was somehow fighting the people of Vietnam, when
in fact it was actually fighting the communists who were seeking to
imprison them.
The fact of the
matter is that it was North Vietnam and the Vietcong, as well as the
anti-war demonstrators in America, who were the enemies of the Vietnamese
people -– not the American government, which sacrificed 56,000 of its
young men in an effort to save them.
Franklin gives us a
long (and terribly boring) account of all the different groups that played
a role in the anti-war
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movement. He is very proud in
remembering the "outrage" that he says served as a key emotion
behind anti-war demonstrations.
But I can’t help
from wondering, Franklin: just where exactly did all this
"outrage" of the anti-war protestors go when the communists did
not bring the paradise that the Left predicted they would? When the
communists started liquidating people en masse and setting up
concentration camps, where was the "outrage" of the Left then?
Franklin isn’t
interested in such questions. Instead, he warns us at the end of his piece
that we cannot "understand what America is becoming if we fail to
comprehend how the same nation and its culture could have produced an
abomination as shameful as the Vietnam War and a campaign as admirable as
the 30-year movement that helped defeat it."
Sorry, Franklin, you
got it twisted: it was the American effort to save Indochina from
communism that was admirable. And it was the anti-war movement, of which
you are so proud, that was the shameful – and shameless – abomination.
Franklin’s article
reveals to us an individual who clearly prides himself in having declared
his partisanship with the communist enemy in the Vietnam War. His only
regret is obviously what most of the unapologetic former anti-war
demonstrators regret: that he failed to personally travel to Hanoi during
the war to volunteer his personal assistance in torturing American POWs.
While Franklin boasts
about what he thinks are the anti-war movement’s great accomplishments,
history reminds us that this movement helped spawn a bloodbath in
Indochina. David Horowitz, who helped to organize the first campus
demonstration against the war at the University of California, Berkeley in
1962, has reflected on this tragedy. In his "An Open Letter to the
`Anti-War’ Demonstrators: Think Twice Before You Bring The War
Home," he recalls how the anti-war movement prolonged the war itself
and how, "Every testimony by North Vietnamese generals in the postwar
years has affirmed that they knew they could not defeat the United States
on the battlefield, and that they counted on the division of our people at
home to win the war for them. The Vietcong forces we were fighting in
South Vietnam were destroyed in 1968. In other words, most of the war and
most
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of the casualties in the war occurred because the
dictatorship of North Vietnam counted on the fact Americans would give up
the battle rather than pay the price necessary to win it. This is what
happened. The blood of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, and tens of
thousands of Americans, is on the hands of the anti-war activists who
prolonged the struggle and gave victory to the Communists."
Giving victory to the
communists spawned a horror for Southeast Asia that made the Vietnam war
look like a time of peace.
After Saigon fell to
North Vietnam in 1975, the summary executions of tens of thousands of
innocent South Vietnamese began. There were to be two million refugees and
more than a million people thrown into the new communist gulags and
"re-education camps." Tens of thousands of South Vietnamese boat
people perished in the Gulf of Thailand and in the South China Sea in
their attempt to escape what the likes of H. Bruce Franklin had helped to
create.
The anti-war movement
in America also facilitated the communist takeovers of Laos and Cambodia.
The Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia led to a killing field in which some
three million Cambodians were exterminated. Paul Johnson has given a
succinct, detailed and gut-wrenching account of this tragedy in his
classic work Modern Times.
The Black Book of
Communism, meanwhile, provides a meticulous and
comprehensive account.
In just a few years
after the communist takeovers in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, more
Indochinese citizens were killed by the communists than had died on both
sides in the whole Vietnam war.
H. Bruce Franklin
wants us to remember the anti-war movement in America during the Vietnam
War. We do remember it.
And we remember it
for what it was: a shameful and shameless abomination, which saw tens of
thousands of spoiled moral degenerates betray the lives and freedoms of
the Indochinese people — as they offered themselves for an association
with tyranny and a complicity with evil.
—Frontpage
Magazine, May 14, 2002
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